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1 Introduction
Many modern industries work around software platforms. Typical examples
are operating systems for computers, personal digital assistants, smart mobile
phones or videogame consoles. The usual feature is that they connect or at-
tend different types of customers that benefit from the interaction among them,
characterizing what is known in the literature as two (multi)-sided platforms.
On the one side, developers write the applications or software that improve the
value of the platform for the users. On the other side, users derive utility from
consuming the system (the platform and the applications). Because of this,
users are concerned about the system price, i.e., the total amount spent in the
platform and the software. The system price will hence depend on the two-sided
pricing strategy of the platform firm which in turn affects the market of com-
plementary applications, and on the pricing strategy in the developers’ market.
This paper offers a model of a monopolist two-sided platform that allows us
to analyze the pricing strategies it will adopt, the level of entry it will induce
in the applications’ market and the welfare it will generate. Furthermore, by
considering that it can become either an open platform or a proprietary one, we
will study the implications of having one or the other. Finally, issues related to
the vertical structure of the platform and to the role of outside options will also
be analyzed.
Two well known and widely used sofware platforms are video consoles and
computer operating systems. In both, users care for the total charge of the
system (platform and applications). Nevertheless they have followed quite dif-
ferent pricing strategies. Operating system platforms charge high prices to the
users and subsidize developers. However, video console firms charge low prices
to users and make profits on the developers’ side.1 We provide here a possible
explanation for the difference based on the margin at which developers compete.
When setting prices, developers may be constrained by one of two margins, the
demand margin and the competition margin. As long as the demand margin
binds, prices of developers affect the overall demand of the system and they set
the price that maximizes their profits, a price that is lower than their marginal
contribution to the users utility. In contrast, if competition margin binds, de-
velopers can not affect overall demand of the system and they are forced to
set a price equal to their contribution to the users surplus.2 What margin is
binding depends on the number of applications in the market and on the level
of substitutability among them. In particular, the competition margin is more
likely to bind as long as users prefer a system with many applications and these
are near substitutes. In the market of video console gamers state that price is
very important in deciding what game to buy. Some of them report having a
huge number of games and, for instance, among the ten top rated PlayStation
2 games, 3 of them belong to the adventure genre and 3 to the role-playing
1This issue is largely analyzed by Hagiu (2005).
2Lerner and Tirole (2004) introduce the two margins to analyze pricing startegies in patent
pools.
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genre.3 These facts allow us to presume that developers writing for the video
console are constrained by the competition margin. However, users of operating
systems need a lower number of applications that indeed are far substitutes, like
a text processor, a spreadsheet or a browser, so that we suspect the developers
in this market are constrained by the demand margin. By analizing how these
margins affect the pricing strategies and the profits of the platform, we find
some conditions that may help to explain features of the market of operating
systems and its differences with that corresponding to the video consoles, and
shed some light on the different pricing routes they have followed. We observe
that the platform price for users is higher when demand margin binds than
when competition margin binds, and this is consistent with the observed fact
that operating systems charge high prices to users, whereas video console firms
charge low prices to them.
When considering the problem that arises if the platform does not set prices
(as an open platform), our model allows us to contribute to the current enthusi-
astic discussion on whether governments should promote (as some of them do)
open source platforms. Nowadays, 50% of European public administrations de-
clare that they use some open source software and the figure is 35% for the USA.
In addition, some large companies are also using open source programs.4 The
literature is not conclusive about recommendations. Hagiu (2005) shows that
there is a tradeoff between the extent to which proprietary platforms internal-
ize indirect network effects through profit-maximizing pricing and the two-sided
deadweight loss they create. He shows that a proprietary platform may generate
a higher level of product variety and welfare than an open platform. In contrast,
Economides and Katsamakas (2006a) find that the variety of applications and
social welfare is always larger when the platform is open source. We here show
that outcomes may depend on the margin that binds. We find some results
that suggest that policy makers should promote open source platforms where
demand margin binds (as operating systems) but not necessarily in platforms
where competition margin binds (as video consoles). In particular, we prove
that if demand margin binds, a proprietary platform and an open platform will
provide the same level of applications, so that the latter will generate more
welfare for users. However, if competition margin binds a proprietary platform
may generate a larger number of applications and higher welfare to users than
an open platform.
In a book about empirical business and economics aspects of software based
platforms, Evans, et. al. (2006) document that almost all the successful firms
in these industries started being one-sided, producing applications at home,
and later they disintegrated becoming in firms producing only the platform
3See Game Daily: June 22, 2004 at http://www.gamedaily.com, Video Game Culture:
Leisure and Play Preferences of B.C. Teens - Summary of Findings at http://www.media-
awareness.ca, and www.gamespot.com, September 2006.
4 In a sample of 600 large companies in USA, 35% use one or more "free" softwares and 39%
of 300 European large firms do so. Forrester Consulting, in El Mundo Digital 22/11/2006. In
Spain, for instance, some "Comunidades Autónomas" are supporting open source. In 2007,
the public administration of Extremadura will start to work with Linux. Andalucía and the
Basque Country are also heading in the same direction (El País Digital, 16/11/2006).
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and supported by independent developers.5 We here try to provide a possible
explanation for this observed fact based again on the margin that binds for de-
velopers. We analyze the incentives of a platform to integrate with applications
(becoming one-sided) as a function of the extent of substitutability among them.
We derive some conditions about the relationship between the welfare effects of
a merger and the degree of substitution of the applications. We also offer an
explanation for partial integration and we show that in the long run the plat-
form will be partially integrated with the killer applications for which demand
margin will bind and will allow free entry for developers of other applications.6
Finally, we study the effects on incumbent platform strategies for facing
the threat of an outside option that offers a surplus for developers or users.
Examples of outside options for users of the video game consoles are those
games that can be played in the computer or online in the internet.7 Writing
these games is the outside option that developers have to the video console.
Outside options for a proprietary operating system are the open platforms such
as Linux. It is developing quickly in terms of number, variety and quality
of applications and availability of support and other complementary services.
In this sense, Linux is now an outside option to Windows and nowadays it is
considered a serious threat to the latter.8 Thus, we can interpret the analyses
as an option that competes or threatens the incumbent platform. Questions
we try to answer with this analyses are, for instance, given Windows being the
incumbent firm, is it the grow importance of Linux in the users’ benefit? What
about developers of softwares?. If Linux becomes more important so that the
value of writing applications for it increases, is this profitable for them? We
find that it would not be in the interest of the users to promote the outside
options (i.e., online games or computer games) to the video game console since,
whenever competition margin binds, a higher outside option value for the users
may lead to a decrease in their surplus. However, an increase in the value for
developers of writing for an open platform such as Linux or Google has a positive
impact in the users’ surplus.This is the case because if demand margin binds,
an increase in the outside option of the developers will always increase the users
surplus.9
The structure of the paper is as follows. We present the model of a monopoly
platform in section 2, and in section 3 we analyze the developers problem. In
section 4 we solve the problem of a profit platform and compare its performance
5Several facts that we cite along the article are documented by Evans, et. al. (2006).
6For instance, Microsoft produces operating system Windows and Office package. Nintendo
wrote Mario Brothers, its killer game.
7Gamers report an average of 6,65 of hours spent per week on online-games
and the home PC use of time explains 25% of children’s and adult’s games.
http://www.cybersurvey.com/reports
8 See www.cnn.com, World Business, "Reclusive Linux founder opens up", 19/05/2006, and
"Microsoft vs. Open Source: Who Will Win?- HBS Working Knowledge, June 2005.
9 In November 2006 Microsoft and Novell have signed a deal so that Linux programs can
operate with Windows. Rivals will collaborate on technical development and marketing pro-
grams (The New York Times, 3/11/2006). A priori it seems the deal would benefit users and
developers, but it warrants further analyses.
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to that of an open platform in section 5. In section 6 we analyze incentives for
integration and partial integration of the platform with applications. In section
7 we introduce outside options to the monopoly platform for developers and
users. Finally, section 8 concludes.
2 A monopoly platform model
We assume that there is a monopoly platform and preferences of users are
defined over the platform, its applications and an outside good. There is a
measure one of users and their tastes for the platform are uniformly distributed
along the unit interval. The utility of a user located at distance t from the
platform is
U = V (M) + x− kt,
where M is the number of software varieties or applications, x is the numeraire
good and k measures the degree of platform differentiation. It is further assumed
that V (M) is concave and increasing in M.10
Every user who purchases the platform consumes at most one unit of each
application and maximizes her utility by choosing applications and consumption
of the outside good subject to the constraint
ΣMj=1pj + x+ P
U = y,
where pj is the price of a unit of application variety j, PU is the charge that
platform sets to the users and y is their income. A user’s decision can be
decomposed into two decision problems. First, the user sets her optimal basket
of applications among the total number in the market,
G
¡
M,ΣMj=1pj , P
U¢ = max
M≤N
{V (M)− ¡ΣMj=1pj¢}− PU , (1)
where N is the number of applications in the market, then the user buys the
platform if and only if
G
¡
M,ΣMj=1pj , P
U¢− kt ≥ 0.
The users demand for the system (size of the network) is hence determined by
td =
G
¡
M,ΣMj=1pj , P
U¢
k
 [0, 1] .
Note that demand depends on the price that platform sets for the users, but
also on the number and prices of applications.
10Similar utility functions are used by Church and Gandal, (1992, 1993, 2000) and Church
et.al. (2003).
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On the other side there are N¯ potential developers of applications, each of
them providing a single different application. Profits of developer of application
i are given by
πi = pit
d − F − PD,
where F is a fixed cost of production, and PD is the price that platform charges
developers to allow them to write platform compatible applications.
Costs of the platform are assumed zero, so that platform profits are given
by,
Π = PU td + PDN.
In this set-up we study the pricing strategies of the platform and developers.
To do so we consider a game whose timing is as follows: in the first stage,
the platform sets the charge to developers and these decide upon entry. In the
second stage, the platform sets the price to the buyers. In the third stage,
developers compete and set the prices for the applications to the buyers, then
finally buyers decide if they buy the platform and the number of applications.
3 Application prices, users payments and Sys-
tem effects
When a user considers buying the platform, her decision will depend upon the
prices set by developers. No user will purchase a video console without buying
some video games, nor an operating system without buying the application
softwares. Because of this we first study how developers set prices which will
be a key point in our analysis. We then solve the second stage of the game at
which the platform sets the price for users, taking N as given. Before that let
us define two elasticities that will be used throughout the paper.
Ignoring the integer problem we define the elasticity of V (N) , a measure of
the degree of substitutability of applications for the users,11 as follows,
ev (N) =
V 0 (N)N
V (N)
.
Since V (N) is increasing and concave, it lies in the interval (0, 1) . For a given
N, we consider that applications to be near substitutes if ev (N) is sufficiently
low.12
Similarly, let us define the elasticity of V 0 (N),
εv (N) =
V 00 (N)N
V 0 (N)
.
11 It has also been interpreted as a measure of "degree of preference for variety" (see Kühn
and Vives (1999) and Hagiu (2005)).
12Our interpretation here is similar to the one in Lerner and Tirole (2004): given N patents
and two surplus functions V1 (·) and V2 (·), such that V1 (N) = V2 (N) , applications are more
substitutable for surplus function V1 (·) than for V2 (·) if V 01 (·) < V 02 (·) .
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Given that V (N) is concave, it follows that εv (N) is negative. The relationship
between these two elasticities is the content of next lemma
Lemma 1 ev (N) is increasing in N as long as
ev (N) < 1 + εv (N) , (2)
and is decreasing if the other inequality holds.13
3.1 Equilibrium application prices
The problem faced by developers is similar to the problem faced by a licensor in
a patent pool. In the context of patents, the licensor problem has been studied
by Lerner and Tirole (2004). In their model, the surplus derived from using N
patents is also a function V (N), strictly increasing in N. They show that, when
setting a licensing fee, an individual licensor may be constrained by either of
two margins that they call the competition margin and the demand margin. In
our context, developers are constrained in a similar way. If the developer can
not increase her price without, because of this, being excluded from the set of
applications selected by the users, (in user’s problem (1)) then the competition
margin binds. In contrast, demand margin is said to bind for developer i, if
she can individually raise her price without being excluded but leading to a
reduction in the overall demand for the system (effect on td). In particular, if
the demand margin binds, a developer chooses a price pi = bp such that
bp = argmax
pi
{piV (N)− P
U − (N − 1) bp− pi
k
}. (3)
Consequently, bp = V (N)− PU
(N + 1)
.
In contrast, if the competition margin binds, the price that a developer sets is
its marginal contribution to the users utility, i.e.,
ep = V (N)− V (N − 1) .
Note that ep depends on V (N) but neither on the demand of the system td nor
on PU .14 Besides, ep is always positive, whereas bp is not necessarily so, as it will
depend on the value of PU .
Next lemma follows immediately from propositions 1 and 4 in Lerner and
Tirole (2004).
Lemma 2 There exists a unique and symmetric equilibrium such that, if ep <bp, developers are constrained by the competition margin and charge equilibrium
13For instance, functions V (N) = log(1 + N) and V (N) = (1− exp (−N)) have ev (N)
decreasing for all N > 0 and it is easy to show that they satisfy the reverse of (2) in all
the relevant range of N. Function V (N) = Nβ , with β < 1, presents constant elasticities,
ev (N) = β and εv (N) = β − 1, then ev (N) = 1 + εv (N) .
14 If we ignore the integer problem, ep = V 0 (N) . Then, εv (N) also represents the applications
price elasticity to N when competition margin binds.
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price ep, whereas if ep > bp, developers are constrained by the demand margin and
charge equilibrium price bp.
As long as demand margin binds, developers set the price that maximizes
their profits and this price is lower than their marginal contribution to the users’
utility. In contrast, if the competition margin binds, the price that maximizes
profits, as defined in (3) , is higher than the marginal contribution to users
surplus and then developers are forced to set a price equal to this contribution.
The consideration of both scenarios allows us to include in the analysis sit-
uations where the developers set the price that maximizes their profits and
consider the reduction in the overall demand for the system when contemplat-
ing an application price increase (i.e. when demand margin is binding). Other
papers in the literature, such as Hagiu (2005) and Church et. al. (2003), im-
plicitly restrict their analyses to an scenario where the competition margin is
always binding. In particular, Hagiu (2005) assumes that developers set prices
for applications once users have bought the platform. Similarly, Church et. al.
(2003) derive the equilibrium prices set by developers under the proviso that
platform sales are invariant to application pricing.15 Our contribution here will
not only be to study the case in which the demand margin binds, but also the
comparisons that will follow. Clearly, some of our results when the competition
margin is the one that binds are similar to those found in these previous papers.
3.2 What is the binding margin?
We now try to establish what the conditions are that determine the margin that
will bind, by using lemma 3.1, and the equilibrium values of prices bp and ep.
Lemma 3 Developers are constrained by the competition margin if the
platform sets a price to the buyers such that
PU < V (N)− ep (N + 1) . (4)
If the opposite inequality holds, developers are constrained by the demand mar-
gin.
A closer look at (4) allows us to determine the binding margin as a function
of the primitives in the model.
Proposition 1 If
ev (N) <
·
1− 1√
N + 1
¸
, (5)
the competition margin will bind. If the opposite inequality holds, the demand
margin will bind.
15 In Church et. al. (2003), V (N) = Nβ . For this utility function they show that the Nash
equilibrium in developers’ prices is given by p (N) = V 0 (N) when N > 1 and β ≤ 1
2
, so that,
in our terminology, the competition margin binds.
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Proof : See Appendix A.
The proposition above shows that the degree of substitution among applica-
tions and the number of developers determine the margin that binds. As long as
applications are near substitutes the competition margin is more likely to bind.
The same occurs when N is large, as the following corollary shows.
Corollary 1 If ev (N) is non-increasing there exists N∗ such that if N <
N∗ the demand margin binds and if N > N∗ the competition margin binds.
However, if ev (N) is striclty increasing, N∗ may fail to exist, so that the de-
mand margin always binds.16
Proof See Appendix A.
From proposition 1 we deduce that those developers that write applications
which are not near substitutes or are indeed complements will tend to compete in
the demand margin. Similarly, those systems composed by a very high number
of applications are more likely to have developers competing in the competition
margin.
Using the results above, if one looks at the observed facts in the video game
industry discussed in the introduction,
1) 76% of gamers state that price is very/somewhat important in deciding what
game to buy,
2) From a survey of over 1,000 game consumers it is known that around 19.10%
of them purchase 1 or 2 games per month, 26.50% purchase 1 every two month
and 6.90% 3 or more per month,17
3) Some players report having more than 50 games,
4) Among the ten top rated PlayStation 2 games, 3 of them belong to the
adventure genre and 3 to the role-playing genre. Among the ten top rated Xbox
360 games, 2 of them belong to the Ice Hockey genre.
Facts 1 and 4 suggest that there exists a near substitution between the games.
Facts 2 and 3 show that consumers usually own a system of console and video
games composed of many applications.
If we compare these facts with those observed for systems of operating sys-
tems and applications (i.e. Windows) we find that it is not easy to find a
consumer using a huge number of applications.18 Moreover, applications are
far substitutes (and sometimes complements). A user may need a text proces-
sor and a spreadsheet and also a browser. Then, we presume that developers
writing for an operating system are constrained by the demand margin whereas
those writing for the video console are constrained by the competition margin.
16This is the case for instance for V (N) = N+
√
N for which demand margin always binds.
Note that if N∗ exists, it is defined by N∗ =
³
1
1−ev(N∗)
´2
− 1.
17Zelos Group Survey: What Do Gamers Want? Everything. Electronic Gaming Business,
Nov 19, 2003. http://www.findarticles.com
18Evans et.al. (2006) point out that, as opposed to the case of video consoles, "there’s
probably not much correlation between the number of applications that someone uses on a
computer and the value that person places on that computer".
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3.3 Users prices and system effects
In the second stage of the game, the platform sets the price for users, taking N
as given. When the demand margin binds, the platform will set a price to the
users as19 bPU = V (N)
2
. (6)
It then follows that the price set by developers will be bp = V (N)2(N+1) .
Meanwhile, if the competition margin binds, the optimal price that platform
chooses for the users is ePU = V (N)− epN
2
. (7)
Equations (6) and (7) put in evidence the existence of "system effects" in
the industry. These effects arise when the value of one component depends on
complementary components in the system.20 The presence of system effects is
reflected in the price that the platform sets to users which increases with the
number of applications. In addition, when competition margin binds ep affectsePU because of the complementarity between the applications and the platform.
In particular, for a given N, when the price of the applications increases, the
benefit that the platform makes per user decreases.21
When the competition margin binds, the relative charges paid by users can
be expressed as a function of ev (N),ePUePU + epN = 1− ev (N)1 + ev (N) .
Lemma 4 As long as applications are more substitutes, applications will be
relatively less expensive, and the platform can charge users more.
When substitution is strong on the developers’ side, prices in this market
are very low and the platform takes advantage of this situation setting a higher
price for the platform. Lemma 4 implies that it is profitable for the firm selling
the console to accept games that compete among them or are near substitutes,
which is consistent with the observed practice in the video game industry as
stated in fact 4.
The relative charge paid by users for the platform when demand margin
binds is given by
bPUbPU + bpN = N + 12N + 1 .
19 See proof of proposition 1.
20 See Evans and Schmalensee (2001). System effects are a clear feature of software platforms
where the user buys a system (platform and applications) and cares for the total charge of
the system.
21Note also that for the same N, bPU > ePU , it is consistent with the observed fact that
operating systems charge high prices to users whereas video console firms charge low prices
to them.
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Note that when demand margin binds, relative charges depend only on N
whereas it depends on both, N and V (N), when competition margin binds.
The next proposition presents how relative charges vary with N.
Proposition 2 If demand margin binds, the relative payment made by users
to the platform is decreasing in N. However, if the competition margin binds,
the relative payment is increasing in N whenever ev (N) is decreasing in N .
As N increases, users tend to spend more on the bulk of applications when
demand margin is binding. The same occurs, whenever the competition margin
binds provided that ev (N) is increasing in N. However, N+12N+1 >
1
2 , meaning
that more than one half of the money that users spend in the system goes
to the platform when demand margin binds. Meanwhile, it may occur that
1−ev(N)
1+ev(N) <
1
2 if ev (N) >
1
3 .
When setting the price to users, the platform should optimally preserve this
ratio, if not, a competitor with a better pricing strategy may easily overcome
the incumbent’s advantages.22
Let the users demand elasticity with respect to the price by the platform be
Ep =
∂tD
∂PU
PU
tD = −1 and the elasticity of demand with respect to the number
of applications be Es = ∂t
D
∂N
N
tD = −
veεv
1−v . The ratio −
Es
Ep measures the effect
of platform price equivalent to a 1% increase in N.23 In the users’ interest, a
1% increase in the number of applications is equivalent to a veεv1−v% price cut.24
This ratio is increasing in v and eεv. That is to say that an increase in N is
more valued as long as it conveys a reduction in developers applications prices
and applications are near complements.
4 Developers Entry and Welfare: Profit Plat-
form vs Open Platform
In the first stage a proprietary platform sets a price to the developers that then
decide upon entering the market. If the platform is open, this price is zero.25
One could think that the platform, through the choice of prices for developers,
determines the number of applications. However, this assertion may not always
22For instance, in the market for video players, VHS overcame Beta after six years of higher
installed base by Beta. The strategy of the winner was a widespread licensing of VHS and
a low- priced VHS player, compared with a high-priced Beta player and restricted licensing
(See Economides 2006).
23Note that if V (N) = Nβ the ratio is −EsEp = 1.
24Clements and Ohashi (2005) have computed this ratio for the USA video game industry.
They find that a 1% increase in game titles is equivalent (in average) to a 2.3% price cut of
the console price.
25An open platform will charge zero to both users and developers. Nevertheless, we will
assume that developers set positive prices to users for their applications. Applications for open
platforms like Linux are often free for consumers. However, there are also several applications
that are not free that are offered for Linux operating system (Economides and Katsamakas
(2005a)).
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be true. In particular, if developers’ gross profits (i.e., p (N) td (N)) are increas-
ing in the number of applications, then the platform can not affect entry which
will equal N¯. This is the case when the positive indirect network effect more
than compensates the direct negative effect of competition. An additional de-
veloper exerts a positive effect on other developer’s profits, explained by the fact
that more participation by one side (i.e., developers) induces more participation
by the other side (i.e., users), which benefits customers and makes them more
willing to participate.26 Consequently, whenever developers’ gross profits are
increasing at N¯ , the platform would charge a price PD
¡
N¯
¢
= p
¡
N¯
¢
td
¡
N¯
¢
−F
and its profits will be
Π = PU
¡
N¯
¢
td
¡
N¯
¢
+
¡
p
¡
N¯
¢
td
¡
N¯
¢
− F
¢
N¯.
In contrast, if developers’ gross profits are decreasing at N¯, because the positive
effect on the demand is compensated by the negative effect on the price, then
there is a one-to-one relation between N and PD, so that the platform rather
than maximizing profits over PD can do so directly over N. The platform will
hence optimally choose N to maximize its profits given by
Π = PU (N) td (N) +
¡
p (N) td (N)− F
¢
N. (8)
From the expression above it is clear that an increase in N affects the profits
of the platform in two ways, through the profits made on users (first term
in (8)) and through the profits made on the developers (second term in (8)).
How these effects depend on the degree of substitution between the applications
that developers offer is quite clear when looking at the profits made on the
developers’ side. If substitution is strong, their profits, gross of PD, are lower,
then the surplus that the platform may extract from them is also lower (or
even negative if it is optimal for the platform to subsidize the developers, i.e.,
PD < 0). Regarding the profits made on the users’ side, recall that both P˜U
and PˆU are increasing in N. In addition, the positive effect of entry on P˜Uand
t˜d = P˜
U
k is higher when substitution between developers is higher (whenever
∂ep
∂N = V
00 (N) is high). When N increases ep decreases, and this additional effect
is taken into account by the platform when allowing access to the developers,
becoming an additional incentive to promote entry. The optimal level of entry
will depend on the margin that binds.
If demand margin binds, the platform will optimally choose Nˆ such that it
solves
V (N)V 0 (N) (2N + 1)− (V (N))2 NN+1
2k (N + 1)2
= F, (9)
26Farrell and Klemperer (2004) state that an indirect network effect arises whenever the
indirect benefit outweighs any direct loss from more participation by one’s own side. Thus,
following this definition, there is an indirect network effect among developers as long as profits
are increasing in N.
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whereas if competition margin binds, it will choose N˜ such that
V
³
N˜
´
V 0
³
N˜
´
−
³
V 0
³
N˜
´´2
N˜ [1 + εv]
2k
= F. (10)
The discussion above is the content of next lemma.
Lemma 5 Let G (N) (H (N)) stand for the developers’ gross profits when
demand (competition) margin binds, and let N∗ be such that if N < N∗ the
demand margin binds and if N > N∗ the competition margin binds. Assume
H (N∗) > G (N) for all N.27 The patterns of equilibrium entry in a proprietary
platform will depend on the binding margin and the size of N¯ . In particular:
i) If H (N∗) > G (N) for all N and N¯ > N∗, in any stable equilibrium of
developers’ entry the competition margin will always bind and the level of entry
will be
N =
(
N¯ if H 0
¡
N¯
¢
> 0
min
³
N˜ , N¯
´
if H 0
¡
N¯
¢
< 0,
where N˜ solves (10).
ii) If N¯ < N∗, the level of entry will be
N =
(
N¯ if G0
¡
N¯
¢
> 0
min
³
Nˆ, N¯
´
if G0
¡
N¯
¢
< 0,
where Nˆ solves (9).
Proof: See Appendix A.
When the platform is open there are no platform prices to affect agents
decisions (recall that now PU = PD = 0), so that developers will enter until
their profits are zero, i.e.,
p (N) td (N)− F = 0.
Lemma 6 Let Go (N) (Ho (N)) stand for the developers’ gross profits when
demand (competition) margin binds in an open platform and let No∗ be the N
that determines the binding margin. Then,
i) G0o
³
Nˆ∗
´
= G0
³
Nˆ∗
´
= 0
ii) Nˆ∗ = No∗ < N∗
iii) Go
³
Nˆ∗
´
= Ho
³
Nˆ∗
´
Proof: See Appendix A.
Point i) implies that the maximum in gross profits when demand margin
binds occurs at the same N in both types of platforms. Point ii) implies that
27This is not a restrictive assumption, all the surplus functions that we are considering here
satisfy it.
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if demand margin binds, gross developers profits are increasing. Whereas, if
competition margin binds, profits may be increasing or not. Note that a com-
parison of outcomes under open and proprietary platforms is not direct for the
range of N 
³
Nˆ∗, N∗
´
as competition margin will bind under an open platform
whereas the demand margin binds under a proprietary platform. Finally, point
iii) shows that developers’ profits are continuous at the point where the change
from a margin to the other occurs.
If gross profits are increasing at N¯ , then N¯ developers will entry. If not, the
number of developers is determined by
V
³
N˜o
´
V 0
³
N˜o
´
−
h
V 0
³
N˜o
´i2
N˜o
k
= F. (11)
The next proposition compares the levels of entry that occur in each case
and the effect on users’ welfare.
Proposition 3 i) If demand margin binds, a proprietary platform and an
open platform will provide the same level of N, so that the latter will generate
more welfare for users.
ii) If competition margin binds a proprietary platform may generate a larger
number of applications and higher welfare to users than an open platform.
Proof See Appendix A.
For comparison purposes, consider now the problem solved by a benevolent
social planner. She would choose the optimal number of applications, NFB, to
maximize social welfare given by
W ∗ =
Z t
0
V (N) dz −
Z t
0
kzdz − FN,
where tFB =
V (NFB)
k .
The first order necessary condition yields the first best allocation,
V
¡
NFB
¢
V 0
¡
NFB
¢
k
= F. (12)
Condition (12) that determines the first best level ofN equalizes the marginal
benefit with the marginal cost of an additional application. The former is the
marginal utility enjoyed by users (V 0
¡
NFB
¢
times the size of the market tFB),
whereas the latter is the fixed cost of producing one more application. Then if
N¯ < NFB social planner chooses N¯ and chooses NFB otherwise.
As long as N¯ < Nˆ entry is N¯ and equals NFB. The same occurs when
competition margin binds and N¯ < N˜. Then, when the effect of N on platform
profits is strong (and this is more likely when ev is high) the platform will tend
to generate the same level of entry as the social planner.
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Proposition 4 Assume N¯ > max
³
NFB, Nˆ , N˜
´
. If demand margin binds,
a proprietary platform chooses a level of N smaller than the first best. However,
if competition margin binds the comparison is not conclusive.
Proof : See Appendix A.
Proposition 3 and 4 yield some insights into policies regarding the emergence
of open source platforms competing with platforms such as Windows (Linux is
the classic one, but there are also some others like Google which offer programs
for free). In contrast, we do not observe the emergence of open platforms in
the market of video consoles. The propositions above suggest that policy mak-
ers should promote open source in platforms like operating systems but not
necessarily in those like video consoles.
5 Integration and the margin
Assume now that the platform firm can also develop its applications at zero
marginal cost and at a fixed cost F per application. Then, if the platform is
integrated, meaning that one firm produces the platform and theN applications,
its system price will be
P I =
V (N)
2
and profits will be
ΠI =
µ
V (N)
2
¶2
1
k
− FN.
We have shown that when integration is absent and demand margin binds,
the resulting system price is V (N)2
³
1 + NN+1
´
which is larger than P I . The ratio-
nal behind the result is clear: under separation there is a double marginalization
as neither the platform nor the developers take into account the reduction of
sales of the others when raising the price so that an inefficiently large price
arises.
However, if integration is absent and competition margin binds, the resulting
system price is V (N)+V (´N)N2 which gets close to P
I as V (´N) gets close to zero,
which is the case when applications are very substitutes.
Proposition 5 Inefficiencies of disintegration tend to disappear as long as
competition margin binds and applications are near substitutes.
Consider total profits of the firm. If demand margin binds, these are
ΠDMB =
µ
V (N)
2
¶2
1
k
µ
2N + 1
N2 + 2N + 1
¶
− FN < ΠI ,
so that the platform will always prefer being integrated in order to get developers
to aware of the impact of their pricing strategies on the other developers and
on the platform profits. Note that under separation even if the platform can
control N through PD, it can not control the price developers set.
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If competition margin binds, profits are
ΠCMB =
µ
V (N)− epN
2
¶2
1
k
+ epµV (N)− epN
2
¶
N
1
k
− FN.
Again, as long as ep = V (´N) tends to zero (because the extent of substitutability
among applications is great or N is very high), profits tend to ΠI .28
The results above are consistent with the observed phenomena that initially
platforms are vertically integrated and later disintegrate. Recall from corollary
1 that there exists N∗ which determines the margin that is going to be binding.
When the industry is less developed (initial steps of the industry with N low)
the platform strictly prefers being integrated. As the industry evolves and the
number of developers available in the market increases, the competition margin
is likely to bind, prices of applications will be V (´N), decreasing in N , and at
this stage of the industry, the platform will be more willing to disintegrate.29
As the market of developers matures and becomes more competitive, the firm
can concentrate on producing only the platform. Note that other alternative
explanations are offered in the literature for the phenomena of vertical disinte-
gration that not can be explained within this model. For instance, Stigler notes
that firms need to arise vertically integrated since technology is not familiar in
the market. When the industry grows, production process are well known and
scale of the market allows specialization, such that disintegrating is profitable.
30 Another different explanation for no integration is given by Gawer and Hen-
derson (2005), when discussing Intel’s strategy. They suggest that managers
were aware of how important the generation of complements was to the success
of Intel’s business; however, although it is in the interest of the platform to
enter complementary markets, the platform knows that this could discourage
entry by new firms.31 A more trivial explanation comes from the fact that the
platform does not always possess the requisite capabilities to produce some of
the complementary goods.32
5.1 Partial Integration
A widely observed fact in software industries is that some computer software
are clearly more useful or more commonly used than others, Office software and
28 In particular, the necessary condition is that V (´N)N be decreasing, i.e., εv (N) > 1.
29PDA’s were born as "smart agendas" offering a limited number of applications. Then,
they evolved to become "small computers". Something similar has ocurred in the mobile
phone industry. In addition to the traditional communication service, today they allow for
hundreds of applications. See "What is a Window Mobile" in www.microsoft.com.
30George Stigler, "The division of labor is limited by the extent of the market", Journal of
Political Economy 59 (June 1951), quoted by Evans, et. al.(2006).
31Dave Johnson, a director of Intel, explained: "The market segment gets hurt if third
parties think: "Intel, the big guys, are there, so I do not want to be there..."... it is not
what we want, because we are trying to encourage people to do these complementary things".
Gawer and Henderson (2005), pp. 18.
32Claude Leglise, director of the Developer Relation Group, responded: "Intel has no
corporate competence in entertainment software. We do not know how to do video games, so
forget it". Gawer and Henderson (2005), pp. 13.
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Messenger are illustrative examples. At the same time, some video games are the
most popular (killer games) in the market, so that applications’ contributions
to total surplus may be different. To incorporate this feature into our model, in
what follows we allow applications to be heterogeneous.
Assume that each application i has a contribution Ni ∈ [0, N ] , with the
normalization
NX
i=1
Ni = N.
Note that Ni = 1 will bring back the homogeneity we have considered so far.
Let us further assume that ∂Ni∂i > 0 and let us define V (·) by V
³PN
i=1 xiNi
´
,
where xi = 1 if user buys application i and xi = 0 otherwise. The next lemma
is inspired in proposition 6 in Lerner and Tirole (2004).
Lemma 8 Assume that gross surplus of users by applications is V
³PN
i=1 xiNi
´
,
where xi = 1 if users buy application i and xi = 0 otherwise, with ∂Ni∂i > 0.
Then, there is a mass 0 ≤ n ≤ N of developers that are constrained by the com-
petition margin and charge a price epi = V 0i , their marginal contribution to the
total surplus. The rest of the developers are constrained by the demand margin
and all of them set the same price bp = V (N)−PU−R n0 epidiN−n+1 . Finally, the platform
sets PU = V (N)−
R n
0
epidi
2 .
When the platform decides PU , it defines the value n, i.e., the mass of
developers that will be constrained by the competition margin. For every i
∈ [0, n] it must hold that epi = V 0i < bp and that V 0i is increasing in i. If n = 0,
we have that every developer is constrained by the demand margin. Analogously,
if n = N every developer is constrained by the competition margin.
Proposition 6 In the long run the platform will be partially integrated with
the killer applications for which demand margin will bind, and will allow free
entry for developers of other applications.
This proposition may help us to explain why platforms are often partially
integrated, most of them with the core application. Microsoft produces operat-
ing systems and some of the applications (i.e. Office package). Nintendo wrote
Mario Brothers, the killer game of one of its consoles. In the US the propor-
tion of games developed in house is about 10% for GambeCube and 8% for
PlayStation and Xbox.
6 Platform Competition: the role of outside op-
tions
Up to now we have assumed that a monopolist platform (either proprietary
or open) provides a good with no competition at all. Nevertheless in many
17
industries, either open and proprietary platforms coexist, or there are several for-
profit platforms competing to attract both users and developers. We now extend
our basic framework by assuming that a proprietary and an open platform
operate in the same industry.33 Our aim here is to analyse how a firm that
offers a proprietary solution will respond to changes in an outside option that
provides a positive surplus or profit to their clients (i.e., to users and developers).
We analyze how the monopoly reacts in terms of prices and we abstract from
other strategies such as investment.34
A user who purchases the open platform gets a net surplus v = V (Z) − h,
where V (Z) measures the utility users derive given the applications written for
the open platform and h is an exogenous cost (interpreted as a transportation
cost or a cost of learning to use this outside good). Consequently, users will
purchase the proprietary platform as long as
V (N )− kt ≥ v > 0.35
The game is solved as in previous sections but considering v. In what follows
we provide some comparative statics analyses to changes in v in order to study
its impact on users welfare. We start assuming that the competition margin
binds. Then, we move to an scenario where the demand binds. We restrict the
analyses to values of N for which developers’ profits are decreasing so that the
proprietary platform can affect entry.
Consider the impact of a change in v on developers’ profits and on the number
of applications. The condition that arises when the platform at the first stage
maximizes with respect to N is
V (N)V 0 (N)− (V 0 (N))2N [1 + εv]
2k
− V
0 (N) v
2k
= F. (13)
and from the comparison with equation (10) it follows that the monopolist will
reduce enty due to the term V
0(N)v
2k . This term is decreasing in N and smaller
as long as applications are very substitutes.
It means that developers of video consoles may not have incentives to increase
the value of v (i.e., writing applications for computers or online games) because
the monopolist may react reducing the level of entry and thus the incentives
for them. However, this response will not be important whenever the games are
near substitutes.
By taking into account its impact on entry, the next proposition provides
results on the impact of outside options on users surplus.
Proposition 7 Whenever the competition margin binds, a higher outside
option value for the users may lead to a decrease in their surplus. In contrast,
33 Since the open platform is considered non-profit, we will assume that it behaves myopically
and hence does not play a best response against the pricing strategies by the proprietary
platform. In contrast, the proprietary platform will take into account the presence of the
open platform when deciding upon its pricing strategies.
34Economides and Katsamakas (2006b) study investment incentives of platforms and devel-
opers in a proprietary system and in an open source one.
35Note that v is used to proxy for the extent of product market competition.
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if the demand margin binds, the impact on users’ surplus of a higher outside
option will generally be positive.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Regarding the other side of the market, we now assume that developers can
obtain a profit of w when writing applications for the open platform. Note that
nothing changes if developers are allowed to write for both platforms (i.e., to
multihome). In that case developers get a higher total profit but the strategies
of the proprietary platform do not change. Results are different if we assume
that developers are forced to choose one of the platforms (i.e., to singlehome)
due, for instance, to contractual arragements. Thus, developers will enter the
market of the proprietary platform as long as
πi = pit
d − F − PD ≥ w.
The effect of an increase in w is analogous to an increase in the fixed cost, so it
clearly leads to a reduction in the level of N.
Proposition 8 If the competition margin binds, an increase in the outside
option of the developers will always reduce the users’ surplus. However, if the
demand margin binds, an increase in the outside option of the developers will
always increase the users’ surplus.
Proof. See Appendix A.
We have shown that reinforcing competition pressure for developers when
competition margin binds leads to a reduction in the users welfare. Results
are quite different when demand margin binds. Promoting the benefits that
writing for Linux has for the developers (sometimes interpreted as a "reputation
effect"36) would be in favour of the users.
Let us provide an illustrative example. Consider V (N) = Nβ where β = 0.45
and a fixed cost F = 0.14. A value β = 0.45 determines that competition margin
is binding as long as N > 2.3 and we restrict the analyses to this range of N.
For a value v = 0.1, the surplus of the users is 0.71 whereas for an increase
∆v = 0.05, the new users surplus is 0.59. It represents in terms of elasticities
that a 1% increase in the users outside option implies a 19% decrease in the
users surplus.37
To compare the effects of w and v, consider now β = 0.25 (so that competi-
tion margin binds as long as N > 0.8) and a fixed cost F = 0.075. Given the
initial values w = v = 0.1, we find that a change in v (i.e., ∆v = 0.05) exerts
a direct impact on PU equal to ∂P
U
∂v = −
1
2 , whereas there is no direct impact
when w changes (i.e., ∆w = 0.05). However, when we compute the total effect,
considering the indirect one by the effect on N, we find that ∂ ePU∂v vePU = −0.01
and ∂ ePU∂w wePU = −0.03, meaning that, under these parameters, the monopolist
decides to reduce the price more for users when there is an outside option for
the developers than when there is one for the users themselves.
36Economides and Katsamakas (2005.b). Other motivations are explained in "Microsoft vs.
Open Source: Who Will Win?- HBS Working Knowledge, June 2005.
37The exercise has been computed assuming k = 1.
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7 Conclusions
We have solved a model that provides some results for a better understand-
ing of the two-sided pricing strategies of a platform that sells a good whose
value depends on the applications sold in a market of developers. We note that
when setting prices the developers are constrained by two margins: the demand
margin and the competition margin. What margin is binding depends on the
number of applications in the market and on the level of substitutability among
them.
We find that if the demand margin binds, policy makers should promote open
source platforms. However this is not necessarily the case when competition
margin binds.
We consider the case where applications are asymmetric in the users’ sur-
plus and we find that in the long run the platform will remain integrated with
the applications for which demand margin binds and will leave for third-party
developers the production of applications for which competition margin binds.
Finally, we find that it would not be in the interest of the users to promote
the value of outside options for the platform when competition margin binds.
However, an increase in the value of the outside option for developers would
have a positive impact on the users surplus if demand margin binds.
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Appendix A
Proof of proposition 1
To show the result we compute the profits that each situation generates for
the platform, then we compare them and deduce the optimal strategy for the
platform. If the platform sets a price that satisfies PU < V (N) − ep (N + 1) ,
then the competition margin will bind for the developers and platform profits
will be eΠPU = PU ·V (N)− epN − PU
k
¸
.
The price that maximizes profits, given the constraint, is
PU =
V (N)− epN
2
if ep < V (N)
N + 2
, and
PU = V (N)− ep (N + 1) if ep > V (N)
N + 2
.
If the platform sets a price such that PU > V (N)− ep (N + 1) , so that demand
margin will bind for the developers, platform profits will be
bΠPU = PU ·V (N)− PU
k (N + 1)
¸
.
The price that maximizes profits, given the constraint, is
PU =
V (N)
2
if ep > V (N)
2 (N + 1)
, and
PU = V (N)− ep (N + 1) if ep < V (N)
2 (N + 1)
.
Comparing above the profits we observe that if ep < V (N)2(N+1) the price that
generates highest profits for the platform is ePU = V (N)−epN2 . If ep > V (N)N+2 ,
the platform will optimally choose bPU = V (N)2 . Finally, whenever the relevant
interval is V (N)2(N+1) < ep < V (N)N+2 , if ep < V (N)N h1− 1√N+1i the platform will
set ePU = V (N)−epN2 and will set bPU = V (N)2 otherwise. It follows that the
competition margin will bind if ep < V (N)N h1− 1√N+1i , and this occurs whenever
ev (N) <
h
1− 1√N+1
i
, as claimed.
Proof of corollary 1
Note that the function
h
1− 1√N+1
i
is increasing in N , equals zero at N = 0,
and goes to one as N goes to infinity. Since ev (N)  (0, 1) , if ev (N) is a non
increasing function, it will necessarily cross
h
1− 1√N+1
i
. However, if ev (N) is
an increasing function, a crossing point may not exist.
23
Proof of lemma 5
When the demand margin binds, developers will enter until profits are zero so
that it is satisfied µ
V (N)
2 (N + 1)
¶2
1
k
− F − PD = 0.
If competition margin binds, the developers zero profit condition will be
V 0 (N)
µ
V (N)− V 0 (N)N
2k
¶
− F − PD = 0.
Consequently, let G (N) =
³
V (N)
2(N+1)
´2
1
k and H (N) = V
0 (N)
³
V (N)−V 0(N)N
2k
´
.
i) In a stable equilibrium, profits are zero and decreasing. Consider now an
equilibrium such that G (N) = F + PD (so that demand margin binds). Since
G (N) < H (N∗) , when N¯ is sufficiently large a coalition of developers will enter
to obtain (at least) profits H (N∗) , and the result follows.
Then,
1) if H 0
¡
N¯
¢
> 0 gross developers profits are strictly increasing so that entry
is N¯ .
2) if H 0
¡
N¯
¢
< 0 gross developers profits are strictly decreasing so that the
platform will choose N = min
³
N˜, N¯
´
, and the result follows.
ii) We must distinguish two cases. 1) If G0
¡
N¯
¢
> 0 gross developers profits
are increasing and entry is N¯ .
2) If G0
¡
N¯
¢
< 0 gross developers profits are decreasing so that the platform
will choose N = min
³
Nˆ , N¯
´
, and the result follows.
Proof of lemma 6
Note that Go (N) =
³
V (N)
(N+1)
´2
1
k and H
o (N) = V 0 (N)
³
V (N)−V 0(N)N
k
´
.
Result i) follows trivially. Note that the concavity of V ensures that Nˆ∗ always
exists. ii) Note that Nˆ∗ solves V 0
³
Nˆ∗
´
=
V (Nˆ∗)
Nˆ∗+1 . The equality Nˆ
∗ = No∗
follows from the fact that in an open platform competition margin binds as
long as V 0 (N) < V (N)(N+1) . To prove that Nˆ
∗ < N∗ recall from corollary 1 that
N∗ satisfies V 0 (N∗) = V (N
∗)
N∗
µ
1− 1√
(N∗+1)
¶
. Since V 0 (N) is decreasing and
V (N)
(N+1) >
V (N)
N
µ
1− 1√
(N+1)
¶
for all N, it follows that Nˆ∗ < N∗. Part iii)
follows from straigthforward computations.
Proof of Proposition 3
i) The first statement follows from point i) in lemma 7 (profits of developers
are increasing under both regimes for the same range of N) then in both cases
entry will equal N. If demand margin binds, with a proprietary platform the
system price is PU + pN = V (N)2 +
V (N)
2(N+1)N, that is higher than
V (N)
N+1 N, the
system price with an open platform, so that the second statement follows.
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ii) From the comparison between (10) and (11), it follows that as long as
ev >
1
1−εv (i.e.V
0 (N)− V 00 (N)N > V (N)N ), a profit platform yields a higher N
than the open platform. The second statement is proven by the fact that when
competition margin binds, the users’ surplus (net of kt) is increasing in N. The
condition ev > 11−εv imposes that εv < −1 since ev < 1. An example for which
a proprietary platform yields a higher N than an open platform is given by
V (N) =
½
(1− exp (−0.05N)) if N ≤ 7
(0.8− exp (−0.1N)) if N > 7,
with F = 0.0045.38 The proprietary platform chooses N ' 25 whereas the open
chooses N ' 24. The competition margin binds for all N > 13.
Proof of Proposition 4
The first statement follows from the comparison between (9) and (12) . The
second statement follows from the comparison between (10) and (12) and the
fact that as long as −ev (1 + εv) > 1 (i.e.−V 00 (N)N > V (N)N + V 0 (N)) the
proprietary platform may generate excess of entry. As in the previous proof,
the condition−ev (1 + εv) > 1 requires εv < −1 and it is more stringent than the
condition in the proof of proposition 3. It does not contradict the condition to
be in the competition margin ev < 1− 1√N+1 , nor the condition for a maximum
in the social planner problem, ev <| εv |, nor the fact that V (N) is concave.
Proof proposition 7
Given a user t, if competition margin binds, her surplus gross of kt is equal to
V (N)− pN − PU . We observe that this surplus will be increasing (decreasing)
in v as long as
£
1− V 00 (N)N ∂N∂v
¤ ≶ 0, and the first statement follows. To
prove the second statement note that if demand margin binds, users’ prices are:bp = V (N)−v2(N+1) and bPU = V (N)−v2 . The platform optimally chooses the N that
maximizes profits
1
k (N + 1)
µ
V (N)− v
2
¶2
+
Ãµ
V (N)− v
2 (N + 1)
¶2
1
k
− F
!
N.
Note that expression (9) can also be written as
V (N)
2k (N + 1)
2
·
V 0 (N) (2N + 1)− V (N) N
N + 1
¸
= F,
and when the outside option appears it transforms in
V (N)
2k (N + 1)2
·
V 0 (N) (2N + 1)− V (N) N
N + 1
¸
−
v
2k (N + 1)2
·
V 0 (N) (2N + 1)− (2V (N)− v) N
N + 1
¸
= F.
38The equilibrium occurs at N > 7 so that V (N) = (0.8− exp (−0.1N)) . Note that V (N) =
(1− exp (−0.05N)) if N ≤ 7 ensusres that V (0) = 0.
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So, the effect on N of v will depend on the second term. If this is positive, the
monopolist will reduce N whereas if this is negative the impact on N will be
positive. Both situations may occur; however since platform profits are lower
for each N, the most likely case is that the monopolist will reduce N.
Now, note that whenever demand margin binds and there is an outside
option v, the users surplus, gross of the cost kt, equals
V (N)− bpN − bPU = V (N)− [V (N)− v]N
2 (N + 1)
− [V (N)− v]
2
The first derivative of this surplus with respect to v is going to be positive as
long as ∂N∂v
h
V 0(N)
N+1 −
V (N)
(N+1)2 +
v
(N+1)2
i
+ 2N+1N+1 > 0. The second term of the left
hand side of the inequality is always positive. However, the term in brackets is
negative as long as V <
h
1− vV (N)
i
N
N+1 , and this is the case along the relevant
range of N (when gross developers profits are decreasing). The first term will
be positive if ∂N∂v < 0 (the most likely case) and negative otherwise, so that the
result follows.
Proof proposition 8
If the competition margin binds the effect of an increase in w on users surplus
is equal to−V
000(N)N ∂N∂W
2 < 0 and the first statement follows. To prove the second
statement, note that the surplus is decreasing in N if ev < NN+1 and this occurs
for the relevant range of N. Given that ∂N∂w < 0, the second statement follows.
26
